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Abstract In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to 
dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist 
can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently 
of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a 
price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and 
solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in men-
tal explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can 
be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.
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Introduction
Why do we explain our actions with mental causes? Are these causal 
explanations or not? What we need are true and relevant causal expla-
nations, explanations of causal relations. Causation plays the central 
role in explanation and prediction. I will argue that a dualist should en-
dorse some kind of a powers (dispositional) theory of causation to de-
fend her theory of mental causation. With such a theory of causation 
dualist would have a better chance of solving the problem of mental 
explanation. Defending a power-based theory still comes with a price. 
Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory and 
solutions that cite such non-events (non-powers) can only defend their 
explanatory relevance in the case of mental causation. 
After some short preliminaries on the problem of mental explanation in 
dualism and the need for a right theory of causation to defend a dualis-
tic position (Section 1) i will consider why dispositions (powers) and a 
dispositional theory of causation are a good pick for the dualist (Section 
2). I will borrow from a powers theory advanced by Mumford and An-
jum (2011) which will be outlined in Section 3. After that i will provide 
some preliminary solutions to the problem of mental causation that a 
dualist could extract from such a theory of causation (3.2). Lowe’s theo-
ry of interactive dualism will be outlined in Section 4. On the ground of 
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Mumford and Anjum’s powers theory i will establish the plausibility of 
the solution by Sophia Gibb, an account in which mental causes are dou-
ble preventers and discuss its plausibility in Section 5. This will bring me 
to the problem of the causal status of absences and preventers and how 
explanations citing such “causes” should be regarded in Section 6. 
1. The Problem
Kim’s explanatory exclusion principle? (EE) and its respective argu-
ment are often cited as the main problems for dualistic mental causa-
tion. Gibb (2009) has scrutinized Kim’s argument and concluded that 
although Kim’s principle is a metaphysically implausible one, the prob-
lem of mental explanation still stands for dualism.? So, how could a 
dualist, trying to give a distinct and independent mental explanation 
beside a physical explanation, defend her position? Some dualists are 
accepting a theory of causation based in a power (disposition) ontology. 
There are several solutions possible once the powers theory of causation 
is endorsed. I will analyze them and see which ones are more plausible. 
Dispositional theory of causation can help the dualist answer the argu-
ment form overdetermination and the argument from EE. By chang-
ing the theory of causation and by accepting causal dispositionalism 
he can answer the Closure demand, accommodate overdetermination 
and deny epiphenomenalism (Bennett 2008: 24). Causal dispositional-
ism doesn’t show that Closure is wrong, but can weaken it. To preserve 
Closure a theory like transference is needed (Gibb 2010). This theory of 
causation is physically biased, and the dispositional theory is not, so it 
is well-suited for dualism. Gibb (2013) suggests an account of mental 
causation as double prevention. In causal dispositionalism absences are 
not causes and double prevention can be used to reconcile all 4 claims? 
that constitute the problem of mental causation. 
1  “Explanatory Exclusion: There can be no more than a single complete and inde-
pendent explanation of any one event e.” (Kim 1993: 238; Gibb 2009: 206)
2  Gibb argues that a weaker principle still stands: “EE*: If two explanations cite 
distinct and independent events as complete causes of an event, then one of the ex-
planations must be false”. Respective argument is: 1. Explanatory Interaction: Some 
physical events have mental explanations. 2. Explanatory Closure: Every physical 
event has a complete physical explanation 3. EE*: If two explanations cite distinct 
and independent events as complete causes of an event, then one of the explana-
tions must be false. 4. Therefore, any event that a mental explanation cites as a com-
plete cause of a physical event is identical with, or dependent upon, that which some 
physical explanation cites. (Gibb 2009: 220). 
3  Gibb (2013) takes them to be: Relevance, Closure, Exclusion and Distinctness.
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Can we solve causal exclusion by changing the theory of causation? Is 
this allowed to the dualist? “Dualists should be allowed to endorse an 
account of causation that allows them to solve the exclusion problem” 
(Kroedel 2013: 13). The exclusion problem could be solved more easely 
if a dualist accepts DTC, then a dependence or production account of 
causation. The exclusion is “most pressing” when we talk of produc-
tion account of causation. This means the transfer of energy from cause 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ory of causation (Salmon 1984, Dowe 2000) is behind exclusion (Gibb 
2009). Some think that the problem of exclusion can be solved if we 
see causation as counterfactual dependence. Just by denying produc-
tion, exclusion problem doesn’t just go away (Bennett 2008: 293). Both 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and should be replaced with a dispositional account of causation. I will 
argue that a dualist has a better chance of defending her theory of men-
tal causation if a dispositional theory of causation is accepted.
To ask for a mechanism of causation in interactive dualism is wrong. 
What is the causal mechanism behind the mental causation? Many 
theories of causation are not mechanistic, like counterfactual, nomo-
logical, and powers theories. Theories that are mechanistic, like trans-
ference theory, are reductive in the sense that they analyze causation 
via noncausal processes, like transferring energy. Even if we analyze 
causation via noncausal processes they still don’t have to be physical 
processes. Ehring’s theory of trope persistence is an example. Disposi-
tional theory is not reductive and is not physically biased. Such prob-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????????
of causation aspire to physical reduction (Mumford, Anjum 2011: 217). 
Such is the theory of physical causation which consists in transference 
of preserved quantities (Dowe 2000).
Now i will say something about dispositions in general and then outline 
a particular dispositional theory of causation of interest to the debate 
about mental explanations.
2. Dispositions
How do we analyze dispositions? They cannot be analyzed just by stat-
ing statistical regularities about behavior (regularity between relevant 
conditions and manifestations); there must be some intrinsic proper-
ty that grounds it, so that a disposition can be explanatory for some 
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behavior. One reason for this is the famous Molier’s problem (virtus 
dormitiva). It is said that opium makes people sleepy because it has a 
dormitive virtue (it is somniferous). If a disposition is just a statisti-
cal fact it cannot explain the behavior of an individual (Craver, Romero 
2011). For a disposition to be explanatory there must be some kind of 
property or a trait that grounds regularities. 
The other problem is that we cannot use conditional analysis for dis-
position statements (Lowe 2011, Craver, Romero 2011). We can’t just say 
that salt is soluble in water, there are ways to prevent this. If water is 
already saturated with salt, more will not be dissolved. Neither simple 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????
argues). Conditional analysis is subject to plausible counterexamples. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tions that are made to go away by the same stimulus that makes it mani-
fest) (Martin 1994) and masks (the same conditions that help the dis-
position manifest itself, prevent that manifestation via a distinct causal 
route, but leave the grounding property).? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ignition disconnects the starter, short-circuiting the key’s disposition 
to start the car (Craver, Romero 2011: 8). When someone is dealing with 
their own shyness they could mask it. This shows us the mechanism of 
dispositions that is useful in psychology and psychiatry, where the term 
itself is already quite common. It also shows why its good to use disposi-
tions in theories with which we try to solve the problem of mental cau-
sation. If someone is shy this prevents him from interacting with other 
people freely, but he could have developed mechanisms to compensate 
it. The dispositions is still there but it can be masked, turned into some-
thing opposite. Maybe we can separate dispositions from behavior of in-
dividuals because the manifest behavior is missing in some situations. 
Craver and Romero warn us that we shouldn’t do this and that it is best 
to understand dispositions both in terms of regularities and traits.
According to Lowe, dispositions are causal powers and liabilities. Eve-
ry disposition (power) has a type of manifestation. But it needn’t have 
stimuli, like Bird maintains. Lowe gives an example of radium’s spon-
taneous power to decay. There is no stimulus for this manifestation. 
4  Mumford also denies the conditional analysis and defends realism. When using 
dispositional predicates we attribute real properties (realism, contra Ryle and Dum-
met). Particulars can have dispositions that never manifest. Dispositions are real 
property-instantiations (Munford 1998: 63).
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Radioactive decay of radium atoms is insensitive to external conditions; 
there is no triggering stimulus. Manifestation is something intrinsic to 
the power, something stimulus is not (Lowe 2011: 23). For a disposition 
to dissolve in water (water-solubility simply is this disposition), mani-
festation is dissolving in water. Carnap, being a neo-Humean empiricist, 
was not willing to accept such a non-observational causal predicate. 
Lowe argues that no conditional analysis of dispositions will ever be 
successful because no disposition has a “stimulus” and a “manifesta-
tion” such that stimulus can be considered a triggering cause (Lowe 
2011: 25). What is commonly called a stimulus is already built into the 
nature of the manifestation, but not into the nature of dispositions, like 
manifestation is. Stimulus is not a cause of a manifestation. If some-
thing has a disposition of water-solubility it means than its manifes-
tation is being dissolved by water, so it will be dissolved when placed 
in water. This condition is already built into the manifestation. Some-
thing being in the water is not the cause of the manifestation. This is 
because manifestation itself is a causing????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?-
ter and being dissolved in water are not logically independent in this 
Humean sense. Stimuli are explanatory redundant and we cannot think 
of them as causes of manifestations. What about the cases when disso-
lution doesn’t happen? Lowe says that there is no single answer and em-
pirical investigation is needed in every particular case. Dispositions are 
fundamental and irreducible (Lowe 2011: 27). 
3. Dispositional theory of causality (DTC)
Dualism is more plausibly coupled with non-mechanistic theories of 
causality. Dispositional (powers) theory of causality (Mumford 1998; 
Molnar 2003; Mumford, Anjum 2011) seems like a good candidate for a 
theory that should be applied to mental causation. In DTC “causation 
is not being analyzed in terms of powers but only explicated by them” 
(Mumford, Anjum 2009: 285). It is a causal primitivism. We use powers 
to explicate causation. Causal dispositionalism doesn’t analyze powers 
with something else, powers already have a causal sense; they are causes 
and there is no non-circular analysis. 
It is problematic to say that the disposition causes its manifestation, 
because they should be distinct and separable, something they are not. 
Both Lowe (2009, 2011) and Molnar (2003) agree that powers get their 
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identity from manifestations (manifestation-types), they are neces-
sarily connected. Manifestation is isomorphic with the power (Molnar 
?????????????????????????????????????????????manifestations and ?????? 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the exercise of powers. “Each manifestation is the product of the exer-
cise of one power” (Molnar 2003: 195). But the manifestation doesn’t 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cause, is usually a combination of many contributory manifestations. 
So these two are not the same.? In Molnar this is a consequence of ac-
cepting the concepts of polygeny and pleiotropy. In genetics a polygenic 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
theory polygenic?????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ???-
festations. Pleiotropy states that one gene contributes to the produc-
tion of many traits. It could be said that powers and their manifesta-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Mumford, Anjum 2011: 211).???????????????????????? ??????????????? ?-
croscopic) events.
When building their powers theory of causation, Mumford and Anjum 
took Molnar’s polygeny in consideration and accepted it. To them, polyg-
eny shows that we should “model causes like vectors” (2011: 12). They 
prefer this model to the neuron diagrams. It is better because it does jus-
tice to the complexity of causation. Powers can work together, or against 
each other (to prevent each other). Powers are illustrated as constituent 
vectors within a n-dimensional qualitative space. In such a model, when 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????Figure 3 in Mumford, Anjum 2011). 
?????????? ?????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????-
nent powers) and a total cause (resultant power). There is a possibil-
ity of causal overdetermination between the component powers and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
(2009) thinks happens. Causal dispositionalism can accommodate the 
5  In DTC there is no talk of events, more of a process consisting of many pow-
ers. Mumford and Anjum (2011) accept Lombard’s theory of events (Lombard 1986). 
Some do not believe in the reality of component powers (Cartwright 1983, 59). Mc-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Wilson (2009).
6 The occurrence of polygeny goes against reduction of causes to one simple kind, 
and so against making reductive and deterministic genetic explanations (Mumford, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 Molnar distinguishes polygeny and pleiotropy from issues concerning single-
track vs multi-track powers.
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possibility of overdetermination and in this theory it is not problem-
atic. Overdetermination is a threat to counterfactual dependence theo-
ries of causation but not to a dispositional theory. The prima facie possi-
bility of overdetermination cannot be ruled out (see Figure 6.2 in 2011). 
Appeal of the powers theory of causation for the dualist is in the fact 
that it can accomodate cases of overdetermination. For overdetermi-
nation to occur between component and resultant powers they would 
have to be distinct. If a dispositionalist has to choose between compo-
nent and resultant powers “it would make more sense to be an anti-real-
ist about the resultants” (2011: 43), but theses authors think that neither 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ure in causal explanations, dispositional terms are explanatory concepts 
(Mumford 1998: 118). Causal explanations describe a phenomenon by 
saying what causes it has (Lewis 1986). In case of dispositional theory 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a cause. If we have many powers that polygenically bring about the ef-
??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???
we speak of the causal explanation. One way to do this is to just count 
the total cause (Mill’s cause). The other way is to pick one from sever-
al partial causes (one of the contributing powers) as the most impor-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
doesn’t have a special metaphysical status, just a special epistemic sta-
tus. Which one we pick is relative. This doesn’t rule out other powers 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
saying there is only one cause (and one explanation) we could even pre-
serve Kim’s exclusion principle. Sometimes we can have just one rele-
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
A common objection is that dispositions are vacuous causal explana-
tions (virtus dormitiva?). Mumford argues that it is ungrounded. Some 
dispositional explanations may be trivial, like when we say that opium 
8  Wilson (2009) has an experiential argument that resultant powers are better 
known. If we adopt an anti-realist position on components by saying that the re-
sultant power is the only real cause, we could use this to defend dualism. Only the 
physical resultant could be known, but there are real (component) mental powers 
that are just invisible. This is akin to Lowe’s proposition.
9  Similarly, Bedau (1987) has argued that although “Cartesian interaction is con-
ceivable it is still not explainable”. He compares it to the virtus dormitiva explanation 
of the opium’s dormitive power which is a “parody of an explanation” (Bedau 1987: 
496). In the case of opium, at least, some kind of explanation is available, no matter 
how trivial. Appeal to a mind-body union can be made to illuminate the Cartesian in-
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made someone fall asleep, but others are not, like when we explain why 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????virtus dormiti-
va explanation can be informative. In explanations we have to pick out 
causal roles, and dispositional ascriptions do that. Explanation is also 
important for dispositions in another sense. In the dispositional theory 
of causation distinction between the stimulus, the disposition and the 
manifestation is purely epistemic, metaphysically they are all powers 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
134). They are all powers but it is their explanatory place that makes 
them distinct. All this will be important for the discussion on absences 
and double preventers.
Causal dispositionalism leans towards an anti-deductivist account of 
explanation and this is the advantage of the theory. There is no neces-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
gap; possibly there was some power that was not accounted for in the 
original model (Mumford, Anjum 2011: 140).?? 
Some think that causation by absence can be considered a counterex-
ample to dispositional theory. In causal dispositionalism absence is not 
a proper cause, not a metaphysical one, but a reference to the absence 
can still give us an explanatory role. How a nothing can have a causal 
power? But in the vector model even the absence of some power has an 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????-
sences are not real causes, because they are something negative, non-
existent, they can still be explanatory relevant.?? Lack of oxygen can kill 
a person. Absences are a problem for the realist. Problem of absences 
can be resolved in causal dispositionalism so that other powers are do-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? This 
theory can show us why we can make sensible causation by absence 
claims, although absences are not metaphysically real causes.
teraction, but it is no better then the virtus dormitiva explanation. That is why Bedau 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
10  This is also useful for dualism.
11  There are three possible responses: 1. Reify absences (??????????) 2. Allow that 
absences can have powers (empowerment) 3. Deny that claims of causation by ab-
sences are true (denial??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
realists, take side with the denial.
12  Jane Suilin Lavelle, George Botterill and Suzanne Lock (2013) argue that by 
adapting Peter Lipton’s contrastive account of explanation absences can be seen as 
explanatory. This way, they think, “the many absences problem” can be solved.
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Although it may not be causation, the conditional is valid. According to 
causal dispositionalism conditional analysis is wrong. This is because 
there are cases of overdetermination and preemption. Overdetermina-
tion on the other hand, presents no problem for causal dispositional-
ism and can be accommodated. In DTC there can be causation without 
counterfactual dependence and counterfactual dependence without 
causation (like in the case of double prevention). Causal disposition-
alism can also accommodate such strange cases like double prevention 
and this will be important later discussion.
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
powers. Some powers produce new ones, some prevent others from 
manifesting. Several powers are needed to light a match or to move your 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
pening (like wind or humidity). Size of the resultant vector determines 
the outcome.
Within the framework of DTC there is more chance to understand the 
minute details and complexity of mental causality. Mental powers (vo-
litions) are part of the causal process that can be helped by or prevented 
by other (possibly physical) powers. The body can resist our willed ac-
tions. When one power is manifested, others can still counter it; it can 
be thwarted. So, the modality of agent causality is dispositional (Mum-
ford and Anjum 2011: 210). 
It is hard to perceive causality. If we stop understanding causality like 
a relation between events, and more like a process we can better per-
ceive causality (2011: 200). Authors argue that Hume’s temporal priority 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????-
ence causality in our own bodies. We can feel the manifesting of certain 
causal powers in us, like willing, for example. Causality is real and it’s 
more then constant conjunction. Willing is not enough for an action to 
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the bodily movement. Mumford an Anjum argue against Hume’s dis-
connected account of causation. 
This model of disconnectedness is wrong because it leaves us with an 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which dispositional partnerships came together and, usually over an in-
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????-
ply this integrated account of causation to intentional causation. DTC 
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emerges as a good theory for mental causation (2011: 206). Temporal 
priority is not plausible. Willing happens in the same time as the move-
ment. In Hume’s account volition would be connected to the movement 
just by constant conjunction and this is “psychologically implausible”. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ??????
connected. For Mumford and Anjum proprioception is another proof 
??? ???????????????????????? ????? ?????????????????? ?????????????? ????
separated. And proprioception enables the perception of causality in 
our bodies. DTC can explain why and how we can bail out of our ac-
tions, like stop moving the hand or change its trajectory and Hume’s ac-
count of causation can’t to this. There is more psychological plausibility 
in DTC. It is in tune with reality of our actions and so better suited for 
mental causation.
Dispositional modality is less then necessity, but more then contingen-
cy, because causes can be prevented. Mumford and Anjum argue that 
in agency this characteristic of causality can be experienced. In agency 
we have two elements that are needed for modal power of disposition-
al: directedness and possibility of prevention (2011: 210). They are per-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
power. Dispositional modality is known directly from experience (2011: 
212). So this type of modality explains modality in normativity and 
intentionality. 
3.2 Powers theory and mental causation
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
your hand) shows us that it is dependent on other powers. To reach the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??-
nar and Mumford defend such composition of powers. Is is plausible to 
say that the manifestation of the will, as a mental power, brings about 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
powers. At least those two properties should be distinct (so dualism). 
??????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
substances. Theory is also neutral regarding the nature of the powers, 
whether they are mental or physical. This is why it can be applied for du-
alistic purposes, but this alone does not mean that dualism is true. Du-
alism will have to pursue independent arguments for itself elsewhere. 
By being neutral it is better suited for dualism then the transference the-
ory which is physically biased. In Mumford there is no qualitative side 
of properties, just a causal one (dispositional), so there is no distinction 
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between mental and physical and dualism will have to add it to the dis-
positional theory. Independently of this matter, I think that the quali-
tative side of properties should be taken into consideration. Denying it 
leaves us with more problems than solutions. We are talking about cau-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and hence causation. At least some properties are non-powers.??
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???-
ment. Object has a power simpliciter to cut wood because it has a prop-
erty that it is knife-shaped, but the manifestation of this power depends 
on other powers (properties) of this object, like, is it made of steel and 
so on. With Mumford all powers are powers simpliciter. Will as a ra-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ???? ???????????????? ????????????????????
several contributing or preventing powers. Manifestation of the will it-
self could be spontaneous and rational, but by itself, it is not enough 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????
doesn’t consider manifestation to be an event, and Lowe and Mumford 
see it more like a process, with many manifest partners.
?????????????????????????? ???? ???????? ????? ??????????????????????
only option. Eating 10 times more chocolate which has a disposition to 
produce pleasure, does not mean 10 times more pleasure; quite the con-
trary. Simple additive or subtractive composition is not always the case. 
What this means is that there is a possibility of emergence in DTC and 
this is promising for some dualists who argue for it.
Returning to what i said in Section 1. Karen Bennett has claimed that 
production is behind the exclusion, but denying it will not take away the 
problem, because it is not necessary for exclusion. She also thinks that 
if we take causation to be pure counterfactual dependence we also can’t 
solve exclusion, because the problem of overdetermination still stands. 
According to the counterfactual theory overdetermination can some-
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in mental causation (Bennett 2008: 294), so it has to be said that cases of 
overdetermination are cases of joint causation. Those who defend it are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Seeing this as a problem, they start looking for a better counterfactual 
theory, but this is not a good solution. No theory of causation that allows 
13  See, for example, Lowe (2010) for a discussion on non-powers.
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both cases (cases when two causes overdetermine and when they don’t) 
can all by itself distinguish between them. Appeal to a pure dependence 
theory of causation cannot show that exclusion is false. Dispositional 
theory is free of these problems. Bennett argues that compatibilism re-
quires physicalism, and so dualist is in a problem. Causal disposition-
alism can accomodate cases of overdetermination (causation without 
counterfactual dependence). Counterfactual analysis is not enough and 
we read conditionals that are true dispositionally (2011: 154).
Dispositional theory has an advantage over counterfactual depend-
ence theory because it can accomodate overdetermination and an ad-
vantage over transference theory because it can accommodate cases of 
double prevention. There are three possibilities before a dualist in DTC: 
(1) if we see mental causation as double prevention, then non of the 4 
claims are dropped, because absences are not causes, so it avoids deny-
ing Closure, (2) mental causation is a case of overdetermination which 
is acceptable, but we deny non-overdetermination principle and Exclu-
sion14, (3) two independent causes (powers) work together to produce 
?????????????????????????????????????????????Closure is violated. Kim’s 
exclusion principle is questioned in DTC. There can be more then one 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????
????????????????????????? ??????? ??????????? ????????????????????????-
serve exclusion principle by saying that there is only one real cause, that 
is the resultant vector. Then only Closure is denied, which is not so sur-
prising for a dualist to claim and the principle itself is very problematic.
Mental power could be a real cause (or one of the causes) of some physi-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it, not seeing it as a cause. According to DTC disposition, manifestation 
and stimulus are on an ontological pair, they are all equally real, but we 
still make a distinction between them, and this distinction is epistem-
???????????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????
condition, not a cause, or miss it completely (invisible like in Lowe). So 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
But this doesn’t mean that the mental power wasn’t one of the causes, 
maybe a preventing one. What science is seeing is possibly the result-
ant cause. Gibb argues that mental powers can be explanatory relevant 
even if they are not real causes. Reverse is imaginable: mental is one of 
the causes, but it is not explanatory visible. 
14  “Exclusion??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
mined.” (Bennett 2008: 281)
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Regarding the status of dispositions, Lipton made a tripartite distinc-
tion: “For dispositions [there is] […] a tripartite distinction: displaying, 
present-but-not-displaying, or absent” (Lipton 1999: 163). 
??? Absence – The object in case may not have the disposition or the 
???????????? ??????????????????????
??? Displaying – If it is displaying, object has the disposition and the 
relevant trigger is present, then it will manifest, 
??? Present-but-not-displaying
Schrenk (2010: 156) thinks there are two possible scenarios here. Take 
the case of sugar’s solubility. Its disposition is present, but is not show-
ing, because the stimulus is not there to trigger it. Other case considers 
Bird’s antidotes. Take an electron that is in an electric and a gravitation-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
capacity, other because of its mass). It has dispositions to accelerate in 
both directions, and the opposite forces are equal, so the electron re-
mains stationary. Although the relevant stimuli are present, and the 
dispositions are there, there is no manifesting because of antidote. 
Schrenk’s conclusion is that the antidote cases show us we cannot dis-
tinguish between (i) being present plus being not triggered and (ii) be-
ing present plus triggered, yet, not manifesting. So, merely saying that 
the disposition is “present” is not enough and Schrenk proposes add-
ing a fourth stage where we have pushing and trying of the disposition 
aiming to manifest and the dispositionalist should have no problems 
accepting it. 
How we should understand the pushing? Schrenk argues that although 
a Humean solution, or a counterfactual one is not accepted, metaphysi-
cal necessity is also the wrong kind. Mumford solves it with disposition-
al possibility. Schrenk thinks this is the best solution because of the an-
tidote cases (Schrenk 2010: 163). The fourth stage could helps us explain 
workings of mental dispositions. Mental powers could be special in that 
they can “try” or aim to manifest or not to manifest even when the trig-
gering stimulus is present.?? Maybe, will is such a power that it has a 
control over its own manifestation. Will could be its own antidote??. 
15? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as a spontaneous power and what he means when he says that the will is a two-way 
power.
16  This is in case we take volitions as dispositions. When physical powers are pre-
sent as triggers that still doesn’t mean that the manifestation will be brought about 
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We could use the polygeny model if we deny Closure. In that case men-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ??????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
in this case we have no sense of responsibility for the bodily movement, 
no feeling of volition. If we want to keep Closure, we could say that the 
mental disposition has a manifestation that is the physical causal chain 
of powers. The disposition itself would not be the cause of the causal 
chain (Mumford would think it is, but in Lowe it wouldn’t be).
Now i will outline two positive dualistic accounts of mental causation 
that work within a powers ontology.
4. Lowe’s interactive dualism
In Lowe’s (1996, 2000, 2008, 2013) theory of interactive dualism men-
tal doesn’t start any new physical causal chains, a mental event causes 
a physical fact. Mental event M causes it “to be the case that certain 
????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
2008: 54). Mental event M is not a direct cause of P1 or any other physi-
cal event, but of the hole causal chain. What is brought about is a state 
??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????? ?????
causation. 
Neural causal chains that start in the limbs branch out like a treetop. 
There is no one direct causal way from the will to hand that is raised. 
Certain bundles of neural causal chains converge to certain behaviors, 
to bodily movements. Convergence is a formal property of some causal 
chains (Gibb 2010: 373). Mental event causes this formal property, will 
causes the convergence, the causal fact, but not as one of the events in 
the chain itself. Mental events make the causal tree of neural events 
converge on a bodily movement non-coincidentally. Without the men-
tal such a convergence would be a thing of chance. It is also invisible to 
the scientist researching the physical events leading to the movement. 
Explanation of the movement in purely physical terms would be incom-
plete, although it would not appear as such, because there are no gaps 
(moving of the hand). I see two options here: that the will antidotes itself, so to 
speak, that it pushes away from manifestation or that there is another mental power 
pushing in the opposite direction of the will, to some other desire. In the second 
case, if there is no strong enough mental power to antidote the will, movement hap-
pens; if there is such a desire movement is prevented or something else happens. 
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in physical causation.?? To make it not indeterminate, we need a mental 
explanation. Also, mental doesn’t control the electrochemical signals 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????-
tion of energy or moment, and this is because a dualist doesn’t endorse 
a transference theory of causation.??
Lowe’s solution is to deny the homogeneity of causal relata (event and 
fact distinction). But they are not distinct enough for this to work, re-
duction of one to the other could be made (Gibb 2002: 80-84). Both fea-
ture property-instantiations on a substance at a time, so properties (and 
powers) are what matters, what does the causal work. There is really no 
substantive distinction here. Both facts and events are tied to the onto-
logical category of properties. Maybe we could try to save Lowe’s prop-
osition by making a distinction between dispositions and their mani-
festation, but they are also very closely bind, or they are both powers 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion that could be used. And, we don’t have to invoke the heterogeneity 
of causal relata to solve the problem of mental causation.
????? ??????????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????
One possibility for an event to be uncaused is that it is spontaneous; a 
substance manifests its power without some other substance making it 
manifest it. Will is such a spontaneous power, not a causal one, accord-
ing to Lowe. But manifesting our will is not an accident, indeterminate, 
will is a rational ?????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????
a spontaneous power because it is a two-way power and it is rational. 
With Lowe this also means that will is an active (a power either to will 
or not to will a particular course of action). Active powers is one whose 
manifestation needs no trigger, it has no stimulus type. It is also a non-
causal power, it is an exercise is not caused by another substance acting 
upon its bearer and it’s bearer doesn’t have to bring a change in another 
substance.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agents cause their volitions.
17  See Lowe (2008), ch. 3.
18  See Gibb (2010) for discussion.
19  Causal relata in Lowe’s account are individual substances. Individual substances 
are concrete bearers of properties (and so, powers). They are ontologically inde-
pendent and never causally inert. In his view all causation is, fundamentally, sub-
stance causation. Only substances possess powers, any talk of events or properties 
possessing powers is derivative. The will, therefore, should not be alienated from the 
agent whose will it is. Agent doesn’t need some power over his will, it is already his 
power. The agent simply exercises his will (Lowe 2013: 157-167)
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5. Gibb’s account of mental causation
One of the most interesting solutions to the exclusion problem in re-
cent literature comes from the mental causation model of Sophia Gibb 
(2013). She invites us to think of mental events as double preventers. 
This comes form accepting a powers theory of causation. She uses the 
neuron model instead of the vector model. Mental events are not di-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanatory relevant. This model makes the combination of Relevance, 
Closure, Exclusion and Distinctness consistent. She uses a powers the-
ory because it distinguishes between a role of causing an event and role 
of permitting an event. Mental event permits a bodily movement (phys-
ical event) to be caused by preventing another mental event that would 
have prevented a neurological event from causing the movement. So, 
the real cause of the bodily movement was the neurological event, but 
the mental event permitted it. 
Gibb argues that her account is empirically supported and is consist-
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
(Gibb 2013: 210). She also claims that it is supported by William James’s 
insights into the phenomenology of free will. Gibb’s account of psycho-
physical causation is very similar to Lowe’s account. In both accounts 
?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????-
tion sees only the chain of physical events. Mental events would have 
no role in explaining the raising of the hand, because there are no gaps 
in the causal chain. 
She takes James’s example of a desire to brush the dust of the sleeve 
(James 1981: 1131). There is an absence??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ing desire, the relevant mental event has nothing to prevent to permit 
the physical causal chain. What initiates the chain then? If i have a de-
sire to brush my sleeve and this power does nothing, how the action 
happens, what starts the chain? Gibb says that Fred’s desire to move his 
hand (mental event m1) permits the moving (physical event b1). If Fred 
doesn’t want to move the hand, m1 does nothing and m2 is not prevent-
ed from preventing n2(neural event)-b1 causal chain. So, m2 makes a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????-
vention. It is the absence of m1 that matters. Isn’t the Closure violated in 
this case? Even with one mental event the situation would be the same. 
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Maybe permitting could be considered as a kind of causing, although 
not a primitive one like pushing or pulling, and such notions of causa-
tion should be abandoned anyway.??
But there seem to be simpler ways to stop or permit or cause an ac-
tion then this, more simple explanations of mental causation and some 
possible solutions were discussed in Section 3, none of which included 
powers that are suspicious causes, like double preventers. From a phe-
nomenological point of view, to me, it feels like a very indirect and cir-
cumstantial way for mental causation and human action to work. On 
the other hand it is a good solution as it makes all the dreaded claims 
??????????? ???? ???????????????????? ????? ??? ??????????????????? ???????
prevention could be just one of the many scenarios in the workings of 
the mental causation. Also, there seems to be only an illusion of free will 
in this account, because there is only permitting and permitting is very 
passive. Double prevention cannot stop or prevent a causal chain, or put 
one in motion without breaching the Closure. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
failing to exercise the power, claim Mumford and Anjum (2009). But 
there is always something that acts upon a power to prevent it from 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???
preventing. Gibb’s account then could have only a limited application. 
When permitting a chain of neurological events, double prevention 
doesn’t deny Closure, but if some of the mental events have to stop the 
chain (veto it) then they are real causes and Closure is violated. So its 
plausibility also depends on how we understand preventing.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
mitting and causing), but it has to be active not passive (permitting by 
not doing anything, by absence) because by this we could be permitting 
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????-
tions”? Sometimes there is responsibility, sometimes not, it is context 
dependent. Absences and preventers are commonly cited in explana-
tions of moral and legal responsibility. If we don’t help someone in dan-
ger, we are partly responsible if he is hurt. If someone tempers with the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
cidently shoots himself, is that person also responsible? Or if a doctor 
20? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pushes or pulls. 
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doesn’t give us the vaccine and we contract the disease that could have 
been prevented have we taken the vaccine, is the doctor’s responsible? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(really) the cause. 
6. Absences and preventers
???????? ??????? ??????? and Lewis (2000, sec. 10) argue that cases of 
causation by omission and prevention are genuine cases of causation. 
Counterfactual and probabilistic theories of causation are also commit-
ted to this (Hitchcock 2003: 20). For others it is a case of pseudo-cau-
sation (quasi-causation, Dowe 2000; dependence, Hall 2000). Process 
theories state that causation must relate positive events, so causation 
by omission and prevention gets a secondary causal status. They follow 
earlier Lewis’s position (1986).?? Hitchcock calls this cases parasitic de-
pendence and remains agnostic concerning the question are they genu-
ine cases of causation. He also says that what we should demand from 
a theory of causation “is not so much that it settle this disagreement in 
one way or the other, but that it identify the respects in which cases of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases of causation” (Hitchcock 2007: 498). He urges us to abandon our 
??????????????????????????????the causal relation, toward analyzing a col-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be bound together.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
lems of taking absences as genuine causes, though it makes a good account of causal 
explanations citing absences as??????????????????????quaternary, contrastive account 
?????????????????????????????????????????c rather than C* causes e rather than E*” 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????? ??????????????? ??
plant to die” should be interpreted as “My napping rather than watering my plant 
caused my plant’s dying rather??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
handle late peemption cases because it is counterfactual. See Deeery (2013) for a 
recent discussion on absence-causal claims in causal explanations and his novel so-
lution that handles both absences and preemption.
22 See, for example, Hitchcock (2007) and Paul, Hall & Collins (eds.) (2004) for 
discussion.
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dualist accepts a powers theory of causation something more is needed, 
so causation by absence or prevention becomes a problem.
Here i am concentrating on the powers theory of causation and causal 
explanation, as defended by Mumford and Anjum (2009, 2011). In try-
ing to establish if absences and preventers can be cited in explanations 
they argue that a theory of causation based on an ontology of powers 
(dispositions) proves its worth over counterfactual dependence theory 
in the case of double prevention. When causation is passing around of 
powers, double prevention is not causation. This is like saying that two 
wrongs make a right, which is not right. If a counterfactual theory is ac-
cepted double prevention could be taken as causation because there is 
counterfactual dependence. This works against some of our intuitions 
about causation. Double prevention is the instance of counterfactual 
dependence without causation that was mentioned before (reverse ex-
ample is the overdetermination).
The problem of these causal claims is that causation becomes an extrin-
sic matter. Other consequences are that there need be no continuous 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a distance is possible.?? Although Lewis accepts them, Mumford states 
that we do not want any of them in a theory of genuine causation. Why 
is double prevention not a case of causation in DTC? Because preven-
tion is non-exercise of powers. “A power is prevented from exercising 
when another also fails to exercise” (Mumford, Anjum 2009: 287). But 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ence on the power to prevent it from manifesting? 
We site those absences as causes that are contextually more important. 
There is a pragmatic reason. The cause of a billiard balls colliding is not 
the absence of another collision, it is because of real, positive powers 
that are there and movements they cause. Although absences can be 
called upon in an explanation of why the collision happened, there is 
no real causal power behind them. Other powers are doing all the caus-
al work and they can be invoked in causal explanations of collisions for 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases of double prevention in that they show the advantage of powers 
theory over the counterfactual theory and they prefer the powers theo-
ry exactly because it rules out the cases of double prevention as genuine 
23  The condition of intrinsicality should specially be preserved as it is important 
for anti-physicalists.
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causation. In their dispositional theory, absences (and double prevent-
ers) cannot be any kind of causes. 
We should not be fooled by common sense intuitions about absences 
which judge some of them to be causes. In many cases of alleged cau-
sation we have no clear judgement. Common sense judges the moral 
status of an absence to be relevant for the causal status of the absence 
(Beebee 2004: 293). But the truth conditions for causal claims do not 
contain a moral element. Common sense judges absences based on con-
siderations of normative features??, which have no place in metaphys-
ics. The problem with the common sense is that it fails to distinguish 
between causation and causal explanation (Beebee 2004: 293). Com-
mon sense moves between ‘‘E because C’’ (causal explanation) and ‘‘c 
caused e’’ (causal relation) locutions. 
Can explanations based on absences be causal? Given explanatory re-
alism (ER)?? and causal realism (causation is an objective feature of re-
ality), to have a causal explanation, there must be a grounding causal 
relation. Since double preventers are not causes (but permitters) expla-
nation based on them cannot be causal. Such relations, as non-causal 
objective relations, can only ground non-causal explanations. If a dual-
ist takes these explanations, citing preventers and absences, to be non-
causal, then even EE wouldn’t be denied.
??????? ??????? ????? ????? ????????? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????????????
though they are not causes themselves. She defends the view that “the 
explanans of a causal explanation need not stand to the explanandum 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they can still be causal explanations, Beebee appeals to Lewis’s theory of 
24  Abnormal, immoral, illegal; violations of norms are specially visible
25  “ER: C is an explanans for E in virtue of the fact that c bears to e some determi-
nate objective relation R.” (Kim 1993: 229). Gibb (2009) has argued that Kim can’t 
infer EE from combination of Causal Exclusion and ER. Kim needs an additional 
premise of the Principle of Explanatory Individuation (EI). I don’t know what is 
Kim’s stance on absences but he says: “a science that invokes mental phenomena in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????
????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
explanation of an event that invokes another as its cause can be a correct explanation 
only if the putative cause really is a cause of the event to be explained” (Kim 2000: 
75). Kim maintains that giving up a “robust notion of mental causal explanation” for 
a “looser and weaker model of explanatory relevance” is possible if Lewis’s theory is 
accepted with some alterations. 
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explanation (1986). Explanations provide information about causal his-
tories of events (Lewis 1986: 216) but they don’t always have to involve 
picking out causes. Sometimes explanations state what events do not 
????????????????????????????? ????kind of events cause or what particular 
event causes another.?? 
When someone is cast into Lewis’s void and is dismembered or a plant 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
causal explanations, describing the causal history in some way, but it is 
other events (other powers) that are the real causes. Since there is no real 
causes in absences but there are causal explanations, they can all be true, 
but can’t be equally adequate explanation (Beebee 2004: 307).?? The ade-
????????????????????? ?????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????
vaccine examples. It is still problematic how we pick the right, adequate 
explanation citing the right non-cause. A dualist defending such an ac-
count can claim that the mental explanation is more adequate. There are 
two causal explanations, a mental and a physical one, but there is only 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Problem for a dualist in such a case is that she accepted a powers theory 
of causation which shows double prevention is not going to constitute a 
genuine case of causation. Double preventers are not causes of an event 
they prevent from being prevented. Gibb says that powers theory shows 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
power theorists would say that it allows us to see more clearly, where our 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????
The complexity of causation and and pluralism of causes cannot be 
stressed enough and maybe a powers theory should accept this cases as 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
simple absences, because there are some real powers working here. 
In Gibb’s account there are two mental events which are permitting a 
causal chain, so permitting could be regarded as a kind of causing, in a 
26  In the sentence “JFK died because somebody shot him” (Beebee 2004: 302) ex-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
true causal explanation, because it says something about the causal history of the 
event of JFK’s death.
27  In Gibb (2009) it was concluded that the weaker version of EE stands: EE*: “If 
two explanations cite distinct and independent events as complete causes of an event, 
then one of the explanations must be false.” Already it was said that double preven-
tion doesn’t deny causal exclusion, but it would seem that it denies explanatory exclu-
sion, if there are two causal explanations in this case. And they both seem to be true, 
but the mental explanation could be a more adequate explanation. This is in case we 
think of the mental explanations via double prevention as causal explanations.
THE NOTION AND STRUCTURE OF EXPLANATION IN THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
239
limited sense, if this account?? is to be defended.?? That there is an ab-
sence doesn’t mean that there is no (mental) power which it is the ab-
sence of. Maybe, it is just a mental power not manifesting itself and 
powers are equally real even when they are not manifesting. Eventually, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in double prevention, there is permitting, and so a relevant explanation 
could be extracted from this. In the case of mental causation, absence 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????
relevant, unlike in non-mental cases. Mental powers could be deliber-
ately un-manifested. Not manifesting, non-exercising a mental power 
could be a conscious act. Even if the right stimuli for manifestation are 
present, a mental power could be pushing away from manifesting.
As it can be seen in the vector model, it is the other powers that do the 
causal work. In case of mental causation as double prevention, mental 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ing all the work. Double prevention as an account of mental explana-
tion works very well for the dualist, and not so much as a solution to 
the problem of mental causation, at least not from a powers theory per-
spective. It seems that dualists should look for a less problematic ac-
count of mental causation then double prevention. 
Primljeno: 27. novembra 2013.
Prihvaćeno: 23. decembra 2013.
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Janko Nešić
Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu
Apstrakt
Da bi odbranili mentalna objašnjenja dualisti mogu se pozvati na dispo-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????
????????????? ????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
na ovakve uzroke mogu braniti samo njihovu eksplanatornu relevantnost 
?? ??????? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????
biti kauzalna, iako se ne odnose na prave uzroke.
Ključne reči: ????????????? ??????????????????????????? ????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????

